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I. INTRODUCTION
Energy policy has been at the center of American political rhetoric
since the early 1970s. Twenty years, five presidents and ten Congresses
later, however, the United States still has no coherent energy policy.
Why has development of a coherent energy policy proved so difficult
for the United States, when other democratic nations have been able to
move so much faster?' I suggest that the root of the problem has been an
attitude, an expectation of plenty.
When colonists first came to what is now the United States, they
found a new world with what seemed to them infinite amounts of land,
water, and energy resources. Over generations, there developed an ex-
pectation of the American people that there was, and always would be,
plenty of everything for everyone. We have been forced over the last
twenty years-as a nation and a people-to acknowledge that our re-
sources are finite. That acceptance has not come easily or quickly.
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There are signs, however, that the dam of inaction has broken, that
this country's people and their leaders are now ready to confront the task
of developing a principled energy policy.
II. WHY HAVE AN ENERGY POLICY
The threshold question of the quest for a national energy policy is
"Why bother?" Because of the almost childlike faith of Americans in the
free market, many people have failed to see the need for a formal energy
policy. Even brief analysis, however, leads irresistibly to rejection of the
position that a free market makes an energy policy unnecessary. The free
market cannot adequately serve society's collective needs. The market
works very efficiently to allocate private resources among competitors,
producing an affordable price and an optimum number of whatever pri-
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1. For example, France has embraced nuclear-generated electricity, combining streamlined
planning approvals and efficient waste-handling procedures, with such success that it has become a
major power exporter. Japan, which imports more than 5 million barrels of oil per day, has diversi-
fied its primary energy mix and sources of supply and built strategic facilities that have provided its
industrial base with singular insulation against short-term price spikes. For discussion of the French
and Japanese policies, see Henry R. Linden, Energy, Economy, and the Environment, PUB. UTIL.
FORT., May 15, 1992, at 31.
2. I first developed this theme, in much the same words, in 1976. See John S. Lowe & Lon C.
Ruedisili, Federal and State Responses to the Energy Dilemma, DISCOVERY, 1976, at 3.
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vate goods individuals seek to purchase. It is axiomatic, however, that
the market does not efficiently produce public goods-products like na-
tional defense or a stable economy-whose benefits accrue to all the indi-
viduals in society whether or not they pay for them.
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If one is concerned about public needs-raising an army, protecting
the national economy, or preserving the environment--some degree of
governmental intervention is necessary. Even a totally free market will
probably never produce public goods because there is almost no demand
from individuals for products such as high technology tanks and fighter
planes or interstate highway systems. Clearly, the market will not pro-
duce such products in the short run, and if they are not produced, there
may not be a long run; outside forces may use their own high technolo-
gies and infrastructures to prevent others from developing countervailing
power.
The present reliance of the United States upon foreign oil imports
and the risks that that reliance presents to the national economy illus-
trates the hazards of failing to implement policies that will provide public
goods. In 1992, the United States economy consumed about 17.5 million
barrels of oil a day, about 39 percent of total United States energy con-
sumption. Of that quantity, we imported approximately 8 million bar-
rels, approximately 45 percent.4 United States' oil imports have been at
least 40 percent or better of total consumption since 1975. One estimate
is that total petroleum imports will rise to an average of 11.1 million
barrels per day by 2000, which will amount to approximately 60 percent
of domestic demand.5 In 1992, United States' oil imports will account
for more than half of the United States' international trade deficit. A
large contribution by oil imports to the United States' trade deficit is
nothing new; in 1990, $52 billion of the approximately $100 billion trade
deficit resulted from imports of oil.6 By 2020, the cumulative trade defi-
cit resulting from oil imports alone will be $10 trillion-more than three
3. P.A. SAMUELSON & W.D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 311, 745 (14th ed. 1992).
4. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, U.S. OIL IMPORT VULNERABIL-
rY 12 (1991). In 1990, the United States obtained about 42 percent ofits oil needs from foreign oil
sources, which was only 4 percent lower than the 1977 figure. In the first three months of 1992, the
United States imported 43.2 percent of the oil that it used. Anne Reifenberg, U.S. Oil Imports Rise
5.7 percent in Quarter, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 16, 1992, at D2. By October, 1992, oil
imports totaled 7.6 million barrels per day, the highest level since the final week of 1978, during the
Iranian revolution. Roger Benedict, U.S. Crude Oil Imports Climb to 14-Year High Level, OIL
DAILY, Oct. 22, 1992, at 1. One estimate is that imports will supply 48 percent of United States oil
demand in 1992. James Flanigan, Oil Industry Can Help Lubricate US. Economy, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 15, 1992, at D2.
5. Lou Bley, Producers Peer into the Future: Report on Issues and Forecasts of Supply and
Demand for Oil and Gas in the United States, PETROLEUM ECONOMIST, July 1991, at 21 (reporting
the Independent Petroleum Association of America's Long Range Demand/Supply Forecast). The
Energy Information Agency has estimated that United States net imports of oil will rise from 42
percent of total oil consumption in 1989 to 55 percent in 2000. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
ENERGY POLICY: DEVELOPING STRATEGIES FOR ENERGY POLICIES IN THE 1990s 5 (June 1990).
6. Louis W. Powers, What the OTA Report Says to Congress, OIL & GAS J., Jan. 20, 1992, at
24.
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times the national debt today and one hundred times the 1990 deficit for
all foreign trade.
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One significance of the statistics is that United States oil imports
impose a day-to-day burden upon the world economy. Because the
United States uses about 25 percent of total world oil imports," an in-
crease in oil imports to the United States tends to cause an increase in the
world price of oil, driving up the price of all the oil used by all consum-
ers.9 An example illustrates the seriousness of the situation. If United
States oil imports increased from 8 million barrels a day to 10 million,
and the world price increased from $18 to $20 per barrel, the total oil
import bill for the United States would increase from $144 million per
day to $200 million, as a result. The cost to the United States' economy
of each barrel of the additional 2 million barrels of oil imports would be
$28 per barrel. 10 Indeed, increases in the United States dependence upon
oil imports has a ripple effect upon the world economy, for other import-
ing countries must also pay higher prices for their imports.
The statistics are also important because they illustrate that ex-
panding United States reliance upon oil imports may present a threat of
disruptive price shocks. The problem is not just the high volume and
cost of oil imports, but our dependence upon oil imports. In 1990,
OPEC nations accounted for 16.67 million barrels per day of the 23.85
million barrels per day in world oil exports, or nearly 70 percent. 1' More
than half of United States oil imports in 1992 will come from OPEC, 31
percent from Saudi Arabia alone.12 A significant interruption in supply
caused by war, natural disaster, or political disagreement could easily
cause a steep and sharp oil price spike and trigger a recession, spiraling
inflation, or some other unpleasant economic effect.13 That happened
twice in the 1970s.14
7. Id.
8. CAMBRIDGE ENERGY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES & ARTHUR ANDERSON, WORLD OIL
TRENDS 36 (1992) [hereinafter WORLD OIL TRENDS 1992].
9. Wilfrid L. Kohl, Oil and U.S. National Security, AFrER THE OIL PRICE COLLAPSE, 1991,
at 156-57.
10. Id. at 157. (Economists call this effect the "demand component" of the "import pre-
mium"). The example is based upon Harry G. Broadman & William G. Hogan, Oil Tariff Policy in
an Uncertain Market, DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES, JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT,
HARVARD UNIVERSITY (Nov. 1986, E-86-1 1), cited in Kohl, supra note 9, at 173 n. 17.
11. WORLD OIL TRENDS 1992, supra note 8, at 34, 40.
12. Flanigan, supra note 4, at D2. In 1990, OPEC provided about 61 percent of United States
crude oil imports, up from 58 percent in 1989, and 51 percent of product imports, compared with 34
percent in 1989. OIL MARKET LISTENER, Mar. 21, 1991, at 1.
13. Kohl, supra note 9, at 158. (This effect may be called the "disruption premium" or the
"security premium" of imported oil).
14. The energy crisis of the 1970s illustrates what economists call the "single supplier" prob-
lem. For necessities of life, demand tends to be inelastic-as prices rise or fall, demand remains
relatively stable. Energy demand is inelastic because energy is a necessity of our way of life. When
prices rise abruptly, consumers cannot quickly reduce their consumption or switch to an alternative.
SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 3, at 70. Because of demand inelasticity, a single supplier
who controls a substantial portion of the market can boost prices at will and reap higher profits
without experiencing a corresponding decline in the quantity sold. The result may be a price shock
1992]
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History was not repeated in the Gulf War of 1990 because world
inventories and excess productive capacity were high. On August 2,
1990, world inventories of oil were at their highest levels in years, suffi-
cient for approximately 100 days of consumption and several days above
normal operating levels.15 What had been a troubling surplus that had
forced oil prices below $15 per barrel became a valuable cushion that
steadied market reactions. More important, world unused production
capacity was greater than combined Iraqi and Kuwaiti production. Iraq
produced about 3 million barrels of oil per day in July 1990, and Kuwait
about 1.5 million barrels-a total of about 4.5 million barrels per day.
Producing countries outside the scope of Iraq's menace-Libya, Iran, In-
donesia, Nigeria-possessed immediate additional sustainable capacity of
approximately 2 million barrels per day. The United Arab Emirates and
Saudi Arabia, though threatened, maintained another 2.8 million barrels
per day unused production capacity. 16 Oil lost to the market as a result
of the United Nations' embargo of oil from Iraq and Kuwait was quickly
replaced. There never was a real shortage of oil during the Gulf War.
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Friendly excess production capacity may not exist when the next
crisis arises. While oil demand in the United States and other western
industrialized nations was flat in the 1980s, demand in Asia and the
OPEC nations themselves surged to an annual rate of more than 3.5 per-
cent, resulting in world-wide increases in oil demand of approximately
1.6 percent a year. 18 Energy economists predict an expansion of approxi-
mately 5.5 million barrels per day of oil production capacity in the 1990s
in four OPEC countries-Saudi Arabia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates,
and Venezuela-but non-OPEC production capacity "may be instead on
a long plateau or even a slight decline," due primarily to the internal
problems of the former Soviet Union.19 We might not be so lucky the
next time an oil crisis looms. 20
In short, I suggest that it is a very easy call that the United States
needs an energy policy. This country must have an energy policy to pro-
that sets off a recession, as occurred in the mid-1970s. For further discussion of the principle, see
Douglas R. Bohi, The Iraqi Invasion, Oil Price Behavior and U.S. Energy Policy, 15 S. ILL. U. L.J.
541, 557 (1991).
Estimates of the reduction in United States Gross National Product levels caused by the Arab
Oil Embargo range from 3 percent to 5 percent per year. Estimates of the reduction in United States
Gross National Product levels caused by the Iranian Crisis of 1979 range from 3 percent to 8 percent
per year. Kohl, supra note 9, at 158-59.
15. CAMBRIDGE ENERGY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, GLOBAL ENERGY ALERT, at 2 (Aug.
1992).
16. Id. at 2-3.
17. Id. PLATr'S OILGRAM PRICE REPORT, Mar. 1, 1991, at 1. Yet oil prices surged upward.
In the panic that followed the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the imposition of United Nations sanc-
tions embargoing Kuwaiti and Iraqi oil, prices nearly doubled-to $30 a barrel-and they briefly hit
nearly $40 in early October, despite the fact that it was apparent that there was no real oil shortage.
18. WORLD OIL TRENDS 1992, supra note 8, at 2.
19. Id. at 2-3.
20. Saudi Arabia is an obvious weak link in the oil supply chain. See Beth McConnell, Former
U.S. Official Says US.-Saudi Tete-a-Tete Might Not Last, ENERGY REP., Sept. 28, 1992, at 646.
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tect its economy and the world's economy. Energy independence may no
longer be a viable goal for the United States, but if we wish to continue to
control our nation's future and to be able to play a positive role in stable
development in the world economy, we must develop and implement an
energy policy directed toward energy security.
III. THE EMERGING CONSENSUS
There are some optimistic signs. While this country has no energy
policy worthy of the name, we are close as a society to an agreement that
we need an energy policy, and that our energy policy ought to take into
account at least three elements: (1) energy diversity, (2) market compati-
bility, and (3) cost internalization. I predict that the United States will
develop an energy policy in the 1990s, and that these factors will define
its scope.
In fact, as I complete this article, Congress has just passed and Pres-
ident Bush has just signed an omnibus energy act. The Energy Policy
Act of 1992,21 the first major energy legislation enacted since 1978, was
thought by some to be "too large for Congress to swallow."'22 In fact, to
secure passage of the legislation that they had considered for two years,
congressional leaders had to strip from it the major provisions that would
have directly increased production or decreased imports.23 The act,
while no longer comprehensive, nonetheless includes halting but impor-
tant steps toward addressing underlying problems. More important to
the point of this discussion, the Energy Policy Act of 1992 was made
possible only by political recognition of the elements that I have
identified.
A. Energy Diversity
Energy diversity means that the United States ought not rely too
heavily upon any single source or supplier of energy. We learned during
the energy crisis of the 1970s, and again in the Gulf War, that it is eco-
nomically dangerous to rely on a single energy resource or a single source
of supply. The only viable response to the economic instability inherent
in an energy policy that relies upon a single source of energy--oil at the
present time-is to move toward energy diversity. The United States
must develop sources of energy other than oil, particularly imported
21. Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (West Supp. 1992).
22. Patrick Crow, U.S. Energy Issues on Hold on Capitol Hill, OIL & GAS J., Dec. 30, 1991, at
21.
23. Patrick Crow, U.S. General Election Can Open Door to Energy Policy Changes, OIL & GAS
J., Oct. 12, 1992, at 21. Deleted from the bill during two years of consideration were provisions that
would have opened portions of the Alaskan National Wildlife Reserve to oil development, en-
couraged drilling on the Outer Continental Shelf, continued a subsidy for coalbed methane produc-




oil.24 Second, we ought to be looking to diversify our supplies of oil and
other sources of energy. To the extent that the United States succeeds in
developing and implementing an energy policy based upon energy diver-
sity, we minimize the risks of embargoes or price shocks that may do
substantial damage to our economy. 2
5
Implicit in the developing consensus that energy diversity is the key-
stone of United States energy policy is acceptance of the fundamental
fact that there is unlikely to be a one-stop, quick fix to America's energy
problems. Twenty years ago, the position of domestic producers in the
United States was that "energy independence" was possible if govern-
ment would just remove price regulations on oil and gas. In the 1990s, it
is obvious to all that domestic American oil and gas production cannot
meet all of America's energy needs. Twenty years ago there would have
been those who would have argued that in the 1990s we would have a
world powered by nuclear-generated electricity. The Chernoble incident
substantially subdued nuclear power advocates. Twenty years ago, nu-
clear power supporters would probably have been drawn into argument
by environmentalists urging that by the 1990s we would have a complete
lifestyle change to a world economy based on solar and wind power. It
has not happened; the collapse of world oil prices in the mid-1980s has
made solar power cost-ineffective. 26 The failure of the likely quick-fix
24. Both of the major Presidential candidates in 1992 recognized this vital point. The Bush
Administration's National Energy Strategy stated that:
No single policy tool can substantially increase America's energy security. The basic
vulnerability involves oil, but reducing this vulnerability requires a broad array of actions:
maintaining adequate strategic reserves; increasing the efficiency of our entire fleet of cars,
trucks, trains, planes and buses; increasing United States petroleum production in an envi-
ronmentally sensitive manner; further deregulation of the natural gas industry; and using
alternative fuels.
PRESIDENT BUSH, NATIONAL ENERGY STRATEGY 4 (1991) [hereinafter NATIONAL ENERGY
STRATEGY 1991]. The Clinton campaign was equally supportive of energy diversity, though it
stressed conservation savings: "Clinton's National Energy Policy promotes national security, energy
diversity, economic prosperity and environmental protection .. " CLINTON FOR PRESIDENT COM-
MITrEE, BILL CLINTON ON NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY 1 (1992) [hereinafter CLINTON FOR PRESI-
DENT COMMITrEE].
25. In fact, diversification of supply has occurred. Since 1979, non-OPEC producers have in-
creased their share of world oil supplies from 40 percent to 60 percent. NATIONAL ENERGY STRAT-
EGY 1991, supra note 24, at 83.
26. We tend to forget the roller coaster-like volatility of world oil prices over the last twenty
years. In the first eight years of the 1970s, the Organization of Oil Producing Countries (OPEC)
used its market leverage to push the average price of oil from less than $2 per barrel to nearly $18
per barrel. World oil consumption grew to over 65 billion barrels per day, nearly 50 percent of
which was provided by OPEC. Panic-buying resulting from the outbreak of the Iranian Revolution
in 1979 sent prices to near $40 per barrel, where they remained through 1982.
High prices spurred major conservation efforts and substantial increases in the production of
non-OPEC oil, which put both the high prices and OPEC's share of the market under pressure. By
1985, world oil consumption had dropped 5 millon to 6 million barrels per day below 1979 levels.
Non-OPEC countries had increased their production 6 million barrels per day over the same period.
OPEC's market share was cut nearly in half, from 31 million barrels per day back to 16 million, as
OPEC fought to stabilize prices at $25-$30 per barrel with production curtailments. Nonetheless,
excess world oil production capacity grew to nearly 10 million barrels per day by the mid-1980s.
OPEC could maintain high prices only by continuing to cut production, which put the econo-
mies of its member countries at risk. In 1980, the OPEC countries' revenues were $284 billion. By
1986, they had plummeted to S77 billion. At Saudi Arabia's insistence, OPEC shifted to a market-
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solutions is important because it lays the premise for the embrace of the
principle of energy diversity. Acceptance that the problem is difficult,
that it cannot be easily solved, is the first step to solving it. That is an
important change.
Energy diversity was a keystone of the Bush Administration's Na-
tional Energy Strategy. 27 The Strategy sought to "diversify the sources
of oil supply outside the Persian Gulf by encouraging environmentally
sensitive production in the United States" and by simultaneously reduc-
ing "the importance of oil to the United States economy-through con-
servation, efficiency improvements, and oil displacement. ' 28 The
Strategy proposed a variety of specific actions primarily directed to en-
abling the United States to produce its way out of oil import depen-
dence,29 including opening portions of the Arctic National Wildlife
Refuge (ANWR) to oil development, 30 encouraging drilling on the Outer
Continental Shelf,31 and speeding licensing of nuclear power plants32 and
certification of new natural gas pipelines. 33
Many of the National Energy Strategy proposals designed to in-
crease the supply of domestic energy did not survive the congressional
gauntlet. 34 Enough provisions promoting energy diversity survived,
however, that one can fairly conclude that a congressional majority ac-
cepted the principle. The Policy Act of 1992 contains several provisions
that should help to make the United States less dependent upon foreign
oil imports, including sections to promote the use of alternative-fueled
vehicles, 35 to increase competition in the electricity generation industry
by easing its regulation under the Public Utility Holding Company Act
share strategy, opening the oil spigot and collapsing prices to $10 per barrel, before restoring official
quotas intended to sustain a price of $18 per barrel. In fact, the world market price at the end of
July, 1990, just before Iraq invaded Kuwait, languished at about $15 per barrel, because many of
OPEC's members failed to stick to their production quotas. ARTHUR ANDERSON WORLDWIDE
ORG. & CAMBRIDGE ENERGY RESEARCH ASSOCIATEs, WORLD OIL TRENDS 2,20-24,44-45 (1991)
[hereinafter WORLD OIL TRENDS 1991].
27. The National Energy Strategy was the Bush Administration's variation upon the congres-
sionally-mandated National Energy Plan, which the Federal Energy Administration Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 761 (West Supp. 1992) required.
28. NATIONAL ENERGY STRATEGY 1991, supra note 24, at 4.
29. The National Energy Strategy, originally issued by the Bush Administration in February
1991, was supplemented in February 1992. See PRESIDENT BUSH, NATIONAL ENERGY STRATEGY:
ONE YEAR LATER (Feb. 1992) [hereinafter NATIONAL ENERGY STRATEGY 1992].
30. Id at 79.
31. Id.
32. Id at 110.
33. Id at 91.
34. For example, the proposals to open portions of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge
(ANWR) to oil development, to encourage drilling on the Outer Continental Shelf, and to speed the
certification of new natural gas pipelines; all were dropped during the legislative process.
35. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, §§ 301-626, 106 Stat. 2776 (West Supp.
1992). The Energy Policy Act of 1992 requires that 30 percent of state and federal vehicle fleets be
converted to alternative fuels--including methanol, denatured ethanol, natural gas, liquefied petro-
leum gas, hydrogen, electricity, "and any other fuel the Secretary determines... would yield sub-
stantial energy security benefits and substantial environmental benefits"-by 1996. The Department
of Energy is empowered to decide how quickly to require conversion thereafter and whether to
extend the requirements to private fleets. Id § 301.
1992]
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of 193536 and increasing transmission access,37 to streamline nuclear
power plant licensing 38 and nuclear waste disposal, 39 and to increase do-
mestic oil and gas drilling by repeal of the Alternative Minimum Tax for
independent oil and gas producers.40 The Department of Energy esti-
mates that the Act has the potential to cut oil imports into the United
States by 4.7 million barrels per day by 2010, which would be one third
lower than presently estimated levels. 41 The Energy Policy Act of 1992
is a significant, if disappointingly tentative, step toward energy diversity.
B. Market Compatibility
A second element of an energy policy in the 1990s upon which there
is substantial agreement is that the programs that we use to implement
an energy policy must be compatible with the market. The United
States' political experience of the last twelve years has convinced the
American public that the market works, that we get in trouble if we im-
pede the market's normal functioning, and that the most effective way to
regulate is to harness market mechanisms. Looking back, for example,
we can see that the oil and gas price controls imposed to protect consum-
ers and the nation's economy against high prices for oil and gas resulted
in shortages of energy and economic disruption. 42
Those who are likely to make United States energy policy in the
1990s agree, across political lines and across the economic strata of our
society, that whatever programs we adopt must be market compatible.43
In the political debates of 1992, all of the candidates preached the reli-
gion of supply and demand. Market compatibility was explicitly incor-
porated in the Bush Administration's National Energy Strategy:
"Wherever possible, markets should be allowed to determine prices,
quantities, and technology choices. In specific instances where markets
cannot or do not work efficiently, government action should be aimed at
removing or overcoming barriers to efficient market operation."" Mar-
ket compatibility of regulations was also a tenet of Governor Clinton's
36. Id.
37. Id. §§ 722-726.
38. Id. §§ 2801-2807.
39. Id. § 801.
40. Id. § 1915.
41. Thomas F. Berg, Congress Passes Energy Bill to Applause of Gas Associations, NAT. GAS
WK., Oct. 12, 1992, at 1, 9.
42. Price regulation of the oil and gas industries costs the American economy tens of billions of
dollars. For an historical analysis, see generally, Richard J. Pierce, Reconsidering the Roles of Regu-
lation and Competition in the Natural Gas Industry, 97 HARV. L. REV. 345 (1983).
43. The consensus that policies should be implemented by market compatible methods is not
limited to energy policy. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1990),
provide in Title IV, Part II for an emissions trading system for sulphur dioxide allowances. The
purpose of the system is to allow polluters flexibility in choosing how to control pollution. For
discussion, see Brennan Van Dyke, Emissions Trading to Reduce Acid Deposition, 100 YALE L.J.
2707 (1991).
44. NATIONAL ENERGY STRATEGY 1991, supra note 24, at 2.
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presidential campaign pronouncements.45 The energy policy of the 1990s
likely will be implemented by market forces, rather than by command
and control regulation.46
The process by which the Energy Policy Act of 1992 was enacted
illustrates the consensus in favor of market compatible regulation. The
final version of the legislation pointedly omitted tightening the CAFE
rules, the Corporate Average Fuel Efficiency Standards.4 7 Earlier pro-
posals included CAFE standards that would have required average fleet
mileage of 40 miles per gallon by 2001 .4  Since transportation accounts
for 63 percent of total United States oil use-about 10.8 million barrels
per day-improvement in average mileage offers a large potential oppor-
tunity for oil savings.49 Average automobile fuel efficiency in the United
States increased from about 17 miles per gallon in 1983 to 20 in 1988.50
In 1975, the average new American automobile got 16 miles per gallon of
gasoline burned.5 1 By 1988, the average American car put on the road
averaged 29 miles per gallon.5 2 Technology is available that would allow
a new car fleet fuel economy of about 30 miles per gallon by 1995 and 37
miles per gallon by 2001 .5
3
Proposals to increase the CAFE standards, however, encountered
opposition on several fronts. The Bush Administration and many indus-
trial state congressmen opposed CAFE increases on the grounds that
they would result in lighter, less safe vehicles, and cost the beleaguered
American auto industry jobs. 54 The proposal's cost effectiveness was also
challenged; some economists charged that higher fuel and emissions sav-
ings could be attained more cheaply by offering a $700 bounty to those
45. Clinton's Environmental Plan included the promise to "harness market forces to reward
consumers and businesses that conserve and penalize polluters and inefficient energy users." Candi-
dates Environmental Positions, TEX. ENVT'L NEWS, Oct. 1992, at 13. Clinton's energy plan prom-
ised to "[d]evelop and implement revenue-neutral market incentives to reward consumers and
businesses that conserve." CLINTON FOR PRESIDENT COMMITTEE, supra note 24, at 2.
46. Command and control regulation will continue to play a role, of course, both in energy
policy and in environmental policy. For example, Clinton's environmental position also included a
promise to improve energy efficiency by accelerating "progress toward more fuel-efficient cars and
raise the CAFE standards." Candidates Environmental Positions, supra note 45, at 13. Title III of
the Energy Policy Act of 1992 contains a mixture of tax incentives and regulatory mandates
designed to develop alternative fueled fleets of commercial vehicles.
47. The CAFE standards, mandated by 5 U.S.C. § 2202 (West Supp. 1992), impose upon each
automobile manufacturer the obligation to meet fleet average fuel efficiency standards for the cars
they sell. The standards are a classic example of technology-forcing regulation.
48. National Energy Strategy (Part 3): Hearings before the Subcomm. on Energy and Power of
the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 102-59 (1991), at 4-58.
49. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 4, at 13.
50. Id.
51. NATIONAL ENERGY STRATEGY 1991, supra note 24, at 65.
52. Id.
53. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 4, at 14.
54. National Energy Strategy: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Energy and Power of the House
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102-59 (1991), Pt. 3, at 4-58 (prepared statement of Linda G.
Stuntz, Deputy Under Secretary for Policy, Planning and Analysis, U.S. Department of Energy)
[hereinafter Hearings]. See also President Bush's statements quoted in Thomas F. Berg, Presidential
Candidates Discuss Energy Issues, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Mar. 15, 1992, at 38.
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Washburn Law Journal
who scrapped pre-1979 cars.55 Ultimately, the CAFE provision was
dropped. 56 I predict that when Congress revisits the CAFE standards, as
proponents have promised will occur early in the Clinton Administra-
tion, market-oriented regulations such as bounties for retirement of gas-
guzzling and polluting vehicles,5 7 a gas tax,58 a petroleum end-use tax, 59
or a carbon tax,6° will become the focus of attention.
C. Cost Internalization
The final element in the emerging consensus on energy policy is cost
internalization. We have substantial agreement in the 1990s that it is fair
that those who create products ought to have the major share of the ben-
efits of the creation of those products. The corollary principle is that
those who create or use products also ought to bear the costs that are
associated with their creation or with their use-that costs should be in-
ternalized. Economists have talked about this principle for generations.
They call it the externality principle. An externality exists when produc-
tion or consumption causes uncompensated costs (external diseconomies)
or unearned benefits (external economies). 61  Economists usually focus
on cost internalization. Their argument is that permitting people to use
resources for their own benefit without requiring them to bear the full
costs generated by the use of those resources unfairly transfers wealth
from the people who bear the burden of the use of resources to the people
who actually use the resources, and encourages overuse of society's re-
55. A study conducted by DRI/McGraw-Hill concluded that a $700 bounty paid to those who
scrapped old cars would save more energy and result in a greater reduction of hydrocarbon, nitrogen
oxide and carbon monoxide pollutants than an increase in the CAFE standards to 32 miles per
gallon. Scrapping Old Cars Seen as Better Option for Reducing Gasoline Use, INSIDE ENERGY/WrrH
FEDERAL LANDS, Oct. 28, 1991, at 6. Americans tend to keep their cars on the road longer, which
slows the impact of higher CAFE standards. The average age of cars on the highway increased from
6 to 7.6 years from 1978 to 1988. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 4, at 13.
Higher CAFE standards would likely result in higher auto prices, which would accentuate the trend
to keep old vehicles running.
56. Senator J. Bennett Johnson and his supporters in the Senate dropped their proposal to open
the ANWR to drilling, and those supporting increased CAFE standards in turn abandoned their
efforts. Holly Idelson, Senate Passes Energy Bill, 94-4; Arctic Refuge Issue Dropped, CONG. Q., Feb.
22, 1992, at 397-99.
57. The Bush Administration asserted that it already had the necessary statutory authority to
institute a program to scrap old vehicles under Title I, Section 108 of the Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1990. Hearings, supra note 54, at 138-39.
58. Independent Presidential Candidate Ross Perot made a 50 cent gasoline tax increase (to be
implemented over 5 years) a cornerstone of his economic program, primarily because of its debt-
reduction possibilities.
59. See supra note 58. Patrick Crow, Consensus Energy Policy, OIL & GAS J., Dec. 9, 1991, at
37. A Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute panel of former high level government energy policy
strategists recently recommended an end-use petroleum tax as preferable either to price controls or
to market regulation.
60. A tax on carbon-based fuels would be broader than a gasoline tax, and would be directed
more to mitigation of environmental concerns than oil imports, but such a tax would have an impor-
tant conservation effect. See Editorial, Why No Carbon Tax?, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1992, at Y8.
61. SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 3, at 376. "More precisely, an externality is an
effect of one economic agent's behavior on another's well-being where that effect is not reflected in
dollar or markettransactions." Id. at 310.
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sources.62 Creation of externalities is a natural tendency of private users
of commonly owned resources such as air, water and oil and gas.6 3 Soci-
ety has responded to the problem of externalities by prohibiting certain
kinds of behavior, or taxing detrimental behavior, or requiring corrective
action. Each of these techniques acts to internalize the costs.
While the concept of the dilemma of the commons and the principle
that costs ought to be internalized are concepts that economists have ac-
cepted by economists for a very long time, those concepts were only re-
cently accepted by the American people. Cost internalization is an
anathema to the frontier mentality. In the 1990s, however, the principle
of cost internalization has become a part of the political fabric.
Ironically, however, though the principle of cost internalization is
now accepted, its application is likely to provide great difficulty in the
formulation of energy policy because its application requires hard and
somewhat arbitrary choices. The major problem is determining what
costs to internalize.
The Gulf War provides a vivid example of the difficulty of applying
the cost-internalization principle. In the panic that followed the invasion
and the imposition of United Nations sanctions embargoing Kuwaiti and
Iraqi oil, world oil prices doubled from about $15 to about $30 virtually
overnight. Prices stayed high in the following weeks, peaking at $40 per
barrel in early October 1990.64 The United States and its allies did three
things to stabilize oil prices---we worked through the International En-
62. Id. at 376. The principle that we should internalize costs by avoiding externalities-by
refraining from imposing costs on people who are not using the resource or enjoying the resource-is
a basic tenant of the environmental movement. The "tragedy of the commons" is the classic hypo-
thetical illustrating the principle that costs ought to be internalized:
The tragedy of the commons develops in this way. Picture a pasture open to all. It is
to be expected that each herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the com-
mons....
As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain. Explicitly or implic-
itly, more or less consciously, he asks, "What is the utility of me adding one more animal
to my herd?" This utility has one negative and one positive component.
(1) The positive component is a function of the increment of one animal. Since the
herdsman receives all the proceeds from the sale of the additional animal, the positive
utility is nearly + 1.
(2) The negative component is a function of the additional overgrazing created by one
more animal. Since, however, the effects of overgrazing are shared by all the herdsmen, the
negative utility for any particular decision-making herdsman is only a fraction of - 1.
Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational herdsman concludes that
the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal to his herd. And
another; and another.... But this is the conclusion reached by each and every rational
herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system
that compels him to increase his herd without limit in a world that is limited. Ruin is the
destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest .... Freedom
in a commons brings ruin to all.
Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244-45 (1968).
63. Garrett Harden, The Tragedy of the Commons 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244-45 (1968); George
W. Sherk, Eastern Water Law: Trends in State Legislation, 9 VA. ENvTI.. L.J. 287 (1990). A "trag-
edy of the commons" occurs whenever "[t]he economic interest of the individual would best be
served by maximizing individual use before other individuals, acting in a similar manner, have de-
pleted the shared resource." Id
64. Roger Vielvoye, World Oil Prices in Jeopardy, OIL & GAs J., Jan. 13, 1992, at 14.
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ergy Agency to mitigate shortages, we released oil from the Strategic Pe-
troleum Reserve, and we raised a military force to protect Saudi Arabia
and eject Iraqi troops from Kuwait.65 Reasonable people may disagree,
however, whether those three actions of the United States and its allies to
get oil prices back down to a price that would not damage the world
economy were costs that should have been internalized in the price of the
oil that we used.
As soon as the initial successes of Iraqi arms in Kuwait became ap-
parent, the United States and its allies began to work through the Inter-
national Energy Agency to share the oil shortages caused by the war.66
Throughout the fall of 1990, the IEA jawboned member nations with
surplus oil to share their supplies with those whose supplies were inter-
rupted by the United Nations' embargo. 67 In early 1991, the IEA gov-
erning board voted to draw on 900 million barrels of crude oil reserves
committed by its member nations, including the United States Strategic
Petroleum Reserve, to avert any shortages caused by the Gulf War. 68
In addition, the United States used its Strategic Petroleum Reserve
unilaterally. In August, 1990 the Strategic Petroleum Reserve contained
approximately 568 million barrels of crude oil, the equivalent of about
ninety days of net crude oil imports.69 The SPR was tapped during the
65. A good case can be made that market forces would have caused world oil prices to drop
eventually, whatever the actions or inactions of the United States and its allies because of the high
inventories of oil and readily available unused production capacity. See the discussion in the text
and accompanying notes 15-17, supra.
66. Bohi, supra note 14, at 554. The IEA is the result of an agreement in 1974 among the 16
members of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to cooperate in
the event of an energy crisis and to share oil when supplies are interrupted. The IEA agreement calls
for its members to maintain strategic stocks of petroleum and to coordinate plans for demand reduc-
tion in an emergency. Id. INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, THE INTERNATIONAL ENERGY
AGENCY 6 (1983). It also requires member countries to sell oil reserves or reduce imports to moder-
ate a severe shortage in the world oil market. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 4,
at 7. The premise of the agreement is that collective action will spread the cost burden over more
countries and ensure that the effectiveness of actions will not be offset. Id. For a detailed analysis of
the information gathering systems of the IEA, see International Energy Agency, . 1413, 1979:
Hearings on S. 1413 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopoly and Business Rights of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 44-73 (1979) (report of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion). For a brief explanation of the IEA's Emergency Sharing Provisions, see National Energy
Strategy: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 101-148 (1990).
67. Not everyone agreed that the IEA was effective. See Phillip K. Verlager, Jr., Understand-
ing the 1990 Oil Crisis, 11 ENERGY J. 15 (1990) (urging that the IEA should use price-based criteria
rather than volume-based criteria to activate its crisis management programs). In part in response to
such criticisms, the Energy Policy Act of 1992 authorizes the President to draw upon the Strategic
Petroleum Reserve where there is an "emergency situation" and "a significant reduction in supply"
resulting in "a severe increase in the price of petroleum products" which "is likely to cause a major
adverse impact on the national economy." Energy Policy Act of 1992, Public L. No. 102-486,
§ 1401, 106 Stat. 2776 (West Supp. 1992), amending § 161 of the Energy Policy and Conservation
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6241 (1988).
68. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 4, at 5, 6.
69. Id. at 5. The Energy Policy & Conservation Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6231-6263 (West
1983), provided the initial authority both for establishing the Strategic Petroleum Reserve and for
formation of the International Energy Agency. Originally planned to reach I billion barrels, the
SPR's maximum size was reduced in 1982 to 750 million barrels (42 U.S.C.A. § 6240 (West 1983))
and then expanded to I billion barrels by the Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486,
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Persian Gulf Crisis in a congressionally approved drawdown by Presi-
dent Bush, who ordered the release of 5 million barrels of oil on Septem-
ber 26, 1990 for a test sale.70  In addition, the Bush Administration
waived the Jones Act provisions requiring that only United States flag
tankers can move oil between United States ports.7' Little oil was actu-
ally withdrawn, however, because world supplies proved adequate and
prices remained relatively stable.72
Finally, the United States amassed in the Middle East an over-
whelming military force that enabled it and its 27 allies to eject Iraqi
troops from Kuwait and crush the Iraqi military in just 43 days of com-
bat. The United States alone contributed 527,000 men and women, 110
ships, 2,000 tanks, 2,200 armored personnel carriers, 1,700 helicopters
and 1,800 fixed wing aircraft to the force. 73
The Allies' political, economic and military actions steadied the oil
markets. The initial success of Operation Desert Storm triggered an un-
precedented $ 10 crash in oil prices in a single day, dropping prices below
$20.74 Iraqi scud missile attacks against Israel and Saudi Arabia brought
prices back to the $20 to $25 range,75 but with the collapse of Iraqi resist-
ance, prices hovered around $20.76 This was no energy crisis. Nobody
had frozen in the dark. There had been no long gas lines, no early clos-
ings, no unconscionable profits-despite the loss to the market of about
the same percentage of oil as was withheld in the 1973 Arab oil embargo.
Those who had prophesied economic chaos were wrong.
But none of the actions the United States took to avert price shocks
was free. The International Energy Agency costs about $16 million a
year to run, of which the United States' share is approximately $4 mil-
lion. 77 The Strategic Petroleum Reserve represents an investment of at
§ 1402, 106 Stat. 2776 (West Supp. 1992), amending § 154(a) of the Energy Policy and Conservation
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6234 (1988). The Strategic Petroleum Reserve is intended to act as a cushion
against price shocks. It had never been drawn upon until the fall of 1990. Bohi, supra note 14, at
550.
70. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 4, at 5, 6. See also Bohi, supra note 14,
at 550.
71. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1601 (West 1983). In January, 1991, only five United States flag tankers
were available to transport Strategic Petroleum Reserve oil. Waiver was important in avoiding a
market bottleneck because 60 percent of U.S. refineries lack access to pipelines serving Strategic
Petroleum Reserve sites. Is It Finally Time to Call Up the Oil Reserves, Bus. WK., Jan. 28, 1991, at
35.
72. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 4, at 7.
73. Anthony H. Cordesman, The Persian Gulf War: An Analysis, WORLD ALMANAC AND
BOOK OF FACTS 1992, at 35-38 (1992). These numbers reflect only United States forces. The 28
nation coalition included 118,000 Saudi Arabian troops, 43,000 British troops with 170 tanks and 72
combat planes, 40,000 Egyptian troops with 250 tanks, 16,000 French troops, and 20,000 Syrian
troops, as well as forces from Canada, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. Id.
74. OIL MARKET LISTENER, Jan. 18, 1991, at 1.
75. Oil Markets Brace for Price Collapse as Mideast War Rages Amid Oil Glut, OIL & GAS J.,
Jan. 28, 1991, at 21.
76. PLATr's OILGRAM PRICE REPORT, supra note 17, at 1.
77. International Energy Program: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Energy and Power of the
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 100-213 (1988), at 54 (statement of
William F. Martin, Deputy Secretary of Energy for International Energy Programs).
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least $20 billion.78 Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm cost ap-
proximately $100 billion.
79
Which of those costs ought to be internalized in the price that
Americans pay for oil at the pump? The gasoline that we buy at the
service station today is made substantially from imported oil, and a part
of the cost of that imported oil is the cost of the International Energy
Agency, the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, and the military power of the
United States. How do we determine on a societal basis which of those
costs ought to be internalized to the consumers who use the products
made from imported oil?8O Cost-internalization decisions can probably
be made in a democracy only by political compromise. Ultimately, we
must recognize that some goods share public and private characteristics,
so that an arbitrary decision of whether and how much of their costs to
internalize is the best that we can do.
The difficulty of applying the cost-internalization principle is a ma-
jor impediment to the development and implementation of energy policy,
however. Cost internalization was at the heart of the defeat of the Bush
Administration's proposal to open the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge
to oil development.81 In the final analysis, the Administration and the
industry could not persuade Congress that external environmental costs
could be avoided.82 On the other hand, the Energy Policy Act of 1992
contained a $150 million per year/$2.25 billion lifetime cap on the
78. Strategic Petroleum Reserve: Hearings on H.R. 3193 before the Subcomm. on Energy and
Power of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 101-159, at 3 (statement
of Congressman Philip R. Sharp). See also Gurney, The U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve: Politics
Prevail, PETROLEUM REV., Oct. 1990, at 498. Another commentator suggests that when interest is
taken into account, the United States' investment in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve "must be ap-
proaching $35 billion or $40 billion." Donald P. Hodel, The Theory of Energy Policies and Pro-
grams, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Fall 1991, at 11.
79. Update on Costs of Desert Shield/Desert Storm: Hearings before the House Comm. on the
Budget, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. 102-12, at 39-40 (statement of Frank C. Conahan, Assistant Comp-
troller General, National Security & Internal Affairs Div., General Accounting Office).
80. Energy Secretary Hodel suggested a "user fee" on imported oil in 1985 to offset the cost of
the Strategic Petroleum Reserve and the United States military presence in the Persian Gulf. See
Hodel, supra note 78, at 11. Others have recommended against an oil import fee because it might
unleash political stresses between oil exporting and oil importing nations. See, for example, the
Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute recommendation reported at Crow, supra note 59, at 37.
81. The Arctic National Wildlife Refuge is a 19 million acre refuge established by the Alaska
National Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1980. The National Energy Strategy proposed opening
1.5 million acres of the coastal plain to oil exploration, estimating that there was a 46 percent chance
of finding recoverable reserves in the area and that production might amount to 870,000 barrels per
day by 2005. NATIONAL ENERGY STRATEGY 1991, supra note 24, at 79. The Office of Technology
Assessment generally discounted the benefit of allowing drilling in the ANWR, saying that the re-
serve was small compared with those in the Middle East and other potential areas already found in
the United States. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. OIL IMPORT VULNERABILITY:
THE TECHNICAL REPLACEMENT CAPACITY, at 17 n.30. However, many industry geologists dis-
agreed with OTA's estimate that ANWR has a potential of only 3.6 billion barrels of oil; they say the
reserves there are almost five times that number. Powers, supra note 6, at 25.
82. Senator Max Baucus of Montana made the point, saying that the oil industry's pledge to
develop ANWR without environmental damage was "a promise that cannot be kept. I reject a
policy that would sacrifice one of the five greatest places on earth for six months of oil." Patrick
Crow, The ANWR Leasing Issue, OIL & GAS J., Apr. 29, 1991, at 37. See also Idelson, supra note
56, at 397.
[Vol. 32
Principles of Energy Policy
amount that nuclear utilities must pay to decommission and clean up
aging enrichment facilities,83 an implicit acknowledgement that nuclear-
generated electricity has a role in United States energy policy.
IV. CONCLUSION
In a perfectly rational world, the United States would have devel-
oped and implemented a comprehensive and coherent energy policy
years ago. That we have not largely reflects the tenacity with which our
people and their elected representatives have clung to our society's his-
toric expectations of plenty. The settlers of what became the American
Republic found what seemed infinite amounts of raw land, water and
energy resources that could be haphazardly exploited to bring wealth.
There quickly developed in our society an expectation that there was and
always would be plenty of everything for everyone. Generations of
Americans have been brought up to believe that each of us should work
hard, be productive, and that the fruits of our labor will come inevitably.
Capitalism is the vehicle that has created and met our expectations
of plenty. Capitalism was particularly well suited to the circumstances
that prevailed in the formative years of this country. Indeed, despite the
burdens it has carried since the end of World War II, our economic sys-
tem has continued to deliver. Few Americans have become truly rich,
but enough have realized the material benefits most seek that we have
been loathe to consider fundamental changes.
I submit that the world-wide torturous economic restructuring of
the 1970s and 1980s have blunted Americans' expectations of plenty.
With the penetrating vision that comes only from hindsight, the Ameri-
can people now see that our expectations have been achieved largely by
squandering our great natural resources and poisoning our environ-
ment-that free enterprise creates externalities.
The stage is set for healthy adaptation of the American dream, and
development of an energy policy will be an important component of that
change. While the specifics of energy policy will continue to be conten-
tious, there is great hope in the public recognition that we need an energy
policy and in the growing consensus of the three elements-energy diver-
sity, market compatibility, and cost internalization-that the programs
that make up a policy should embrace.
83. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 1101, 106 Stat. 2776 (West Supp. 1992).
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